This post originated from an RSS feed registered with Python Buzz
by Andrew Dalke.
Original Post: SDI, soft power, and gas != WMD
Feed Title: Andrew Dalke's writings
Feed URL: http://www.dalkescientific.com/writings/diary/diary-rss.xml
Feed Description: Writings from the software side of bioinformatics and chemical informatics, with a heaping of Python thrown in for good measure.
I heard on the news
this afternoon that the US Strategic Defense Initiative project
(better known as `Star Wars') is using a spiral development model
taken from software development projects instead of a more traditional
one. This allows them to start development before the whole system is
complete.
I use the spiral development model a lot. It's one of McConnell's
"Best Practices" in his book Rapid Development. One of the key
points is to have many deployables, to test and get rapid feedback for
the next loop through the spiral.
The SDI spiral doesn't have that essential feature. There have been
only a fraction of the tests done as were planned for this time, and
those tests were not against a realistic target. Yet the project is
already building a launch site in Alaska as well as a radar system for
it. Why there? Because the only close-to-realistic threat is North
Korea and China.
A much more likely scenario is to deliver any such nuke via container
ship since 1) it's a whole lot cheaper than developing an ICBM, and 2)
less than 5% of the shipping into this country is inspected. That
ratio could go way up with some of the $10 billion requested for next
year, much less the $130 billion wasted so far on a weapons system
which has been 21 year in development.
This new installation they're building up north? They had to get a
waiver before doing it! See, most projects have to show that they'll
be sucessful before being deployed. But not this one. Go ahead and
build it 'cause the schedule says we need to have this highly
experimental project done by this time. Even it there's a remote
chance of it actually working "at least it's better than nothing."
Except that isn't the only way to spend the money. $120 billion + $10
billion/year can make for a very good espionage network and a lot of
bribes to find out just who is doing what. And fund a lot of cultural
exchanges, study programs, and other forms of soft power to make
people less likely to want to harm us. But this administration
especially seems to think only hard power counts and amoung other
things has
made it harder
to get a scientific or cultural visa to enter the US, and of course
started treating all them furriners as criminals and now photographs
and fingerprints (!) most every non-citizen crossing the border.
What a message we send to the rest of the world. I will recommend
that we align next year's BOSC with a European
conference rather than ISMB, which will likely be in the US next year.
Two years ago it was in Canada. We almost didn't get the South
African contingent because they didn't realize they needed a US visa
to transit a US airport from one international flight to another.
Luckily, the US had the TWOV program (Travelers WithOut Visa) which
meant they could make it. But that was canceled last year.
Why is all this happening? Because US citizens are frighted of the
next attack? No, it's because the people in charge don't want to be
blamed for the next failure. The risk analysis isn't done based on
how it affects America, it's on done with a personal calculus. "If I
implement nasty, horrible, un-American policy X I can justify it on
being the 'post-9/11 era.' If I don't do it and something happens
people will blame me and I'll loose my job. If I do it and something
happens I just say we didn't get enough funding and blame someone
else." The only career risk then is to stand up for trust, respect,
and dignity. And when did that pay?
Some people might argue that the money spent on SDI will have less
tangible benefits, like the spin-offs of the space program. My
response is that the National Science Foundation requested a budget of
about $5.7 billion for next year, or just over half spent on
SDI. Surely tripling the NSF budget will lead to a few more
spin-offs than SDI.
As you might tell, I'm rather ticked off about this. It didn't help
that I listened to Bush's speech which repeated yet again the canard
that chemical weapons are "Weapons of Mass Destruction." If that's
the case then the chemical weapons of World War I should each
be comparable to a nuke in effectiveness.
It's estimated
that about 1.1 million people were casualties from gas attacks in
that war with about 130,000 tons of gas used. That's over 100 kilos
of gas per casualty.
The referenced page says that by the end of the war gas was pretty
useless because of advances in protection against gas. If it takes so
much effort to use gas in warfare than how was it so effective against
Iraqi citizens? (In the late 1980s, btw, when Iraq was our ally
against Iran - Operation Staunch - and well before the First Gulf
War.) Because this was a Kurdish town already under attack by the
Iraqi army, defenseless against any sort of bombing (and they were
being attacked by conventional bombs as well) and ill-prepared. They
went into bomb shelters not realizing gas is heavier than air, making
a death trap. (Hence why people figured gas would be useful in the
trenches of WWI.)
Don't get me wrong. Chemical gas attacks are nasty and their effects
and linger long beyond the war even into the children of those
attacked. That's the main reason they've been banned for almost a
century. But that doesn't make it a weapon of mass destruction! You
could talk it's about the potential for mass destruction, in which case
plastic bottles filled with gasoline and lit by one person can kill
198. The Kurd gassing killed about 5,000. Hiroshima killed about 100,000.